SHOUTS, HYMNS, and drumming resonated throughout Gwanghwamun Plaza as thousands of protesters marched on the 75th anniversary of the National Liberation Day, Aug. 15, 2020. The area flooded with people waving flags and signs while the police surrounded them restlessly, trying to keep them in check. Although political rallies on this significant day are common, the lingering threat of a mass infection of COVID-19 had everyone waiting with bated breath to see if this would lead to yet another mass infection; unfortunately, their fears would come true.

Before the storm

   A gathering on Liberation Day in itself was not unexpected. Controversial policies such as real estate restrictions, the transition of temporary workers to permanent positions, and the increase of the medical school admission quota sparked protests throughout the months of July and August. Although these rallies often brought thousands of attendees, they weren’t seen as a major health risk due to their controlled nature. However, this wasn’t the case for this year’s Liberation Day rally. Days before August 15, 33 groups announced their plans for a political gathering in Seoul with an estimated 110,000 attendees*. Fearing mass infections, the city of Seoul asked for voluntary withdrawals to largely negative responses and issued an executive ban order on August 13. While some groups relented, many maintained their intent to congregate, claiming that the ban was a politically motivated infringement of basic political rights**. In fact, the groups Guk-to-bon (the April 15 Rigged Election group) and Il pa man pa, with 4,000 and 100 attendees respectively, successfully received permission for their rallies. Although the official number of attendees was in the thousands, city officials and the police speculated that the actual number would exceed it***.

Who, what, when, where, and why

   The authorities’ expectations proved correct on August 15; approximately 20,000 people attended the rallies at Gwanghwamun Plaza, Joong-gu, and Jongno-gu, although the exact number varies depending on sources. Flocks of buses from all over the country joined in, and the streets were soon packed. Individuals from groups that were denied from holding their own rally, such as Dae-guk-bon (Headquarters of Setting Korea Right) and Freedom Union, also joined in****. The convergence of civic groups with similar anti-Moon administration sentiment resulted in a mix of various agendas in the Gwanghwamun rally, from calling foul on April’s legislative elections to protesting real estate policies. Meanwhile, the Korean Confederation of Trade Unions (KCTU) held its own gathering in front of Bosingak to call for workers’ rights and improve relations with North Korea. What was initially planned as a rally was switched to a “press conference” when concern over a mass infection arose, although it still drew around 2,000 people*****. Because more people gathered in Seoul than initially expected, the government tracked down attendees and urged them to refrain from daily activities to prevent another outbreak. However, the rallies soon generated a second upsurge of infections, mostly in the Seoul region and other big cities like Gwangju and Daegu.

   Although most participants brought masks, many Gwanghwamun rally participants were seen bare-faced during the day. Some were observed eating together without keeping a safe distance, leading many to criticize their noncompliance to health protocol. On the other hand, the KCTU didn’t receive as much media coverage as their counterparts. Although they held a mass gathering as well, the KCTU’s adherence to health protocol, such as wearing face masks, keeping a safe distance, and cooperating with authorities, made them less open to public criticism—or so it seemed initially******.

   Out of the many groups that participated in the rally, the Sa rang je il Presbyterian Church garnered the most public attention. Infamous for a pre-rally mass infection within the congregation and their extreme anti-government stance, Sa rang je il Church members were assumed to take up a significant portion of the Gwanghwamun protests despite their own rally being called off. Members were encouraged to participate in the rally by their leader, Head Pastor Jeon Kwang-hoon*******. Chosun Ilbo reported that church members went to the rally knowing that fellow members had contracted the virus, while Jeon himself defied the two-week quarantine order he was under at the time to make an appearance.

   In an interview with The Yonsei Annals, Professor Jung Sun-jae (Assistant Prof., Dept. of Preventive Medicine & Public Health) explained that the presence of infected patients was the key difference between the two rallies. “In Gwanghwamun, there were confirmed patients who attended the rally that contributed to the spread within the group, while the Bosingak meeting didn’t have confirmed cases at the time.” She demonstrated that KCTU rally members had consistency in their demographics and were more organized as a group, while the rally in Gwanghwamun had a more diverse age range with a high attendance of elderly citizens and was less organized, thus making it harder to control and track the latter. Nevertheless, Professor Jung also pointed out that there’s no confirmation that the Bosingak conference was objectively safe as there’s a high rate of untraceable infections and called it “very fortunate” that the press conference didn’t have as far-reaching consequences as the rally.

   Consequently, the month of August saw an almost exponential increase of COVID-19 infections. In August, 5,846 cases were reported, exceeding the previous month’s statistic (1,486) by almost four-fold, with mid-to-late August’s daily infections breaking into the four hundreds********. Most were concentrated in and around Seoul, the most densely populated and traffic-heavy economic hub, creating fear about the country’s economic and medical systems breaking down. Although there were other sources of infection during this time, many made the connection between the rallies and the sudden uptick in infection cases. The fact that infected patients attended the rally, didn’t comply with social distancing during the event, and resisted government prevention methods all led to the public pointing to the church and the rally as the main causes of the second wave.

The case of finger-pointing

   The sudden surge of cases set off a blame game in between societal institutions—churches, the government, and the media—as well as between liberal and conservative political parties. In response to the Democratic Party’s criticism, the United Future Party********* firmly denied its connection to Pastor Jeon and the Gwanghwamun rally**********. At the same time, however, DT News reported that current party members like Hong Moon-pyo and ex-Party members were seen at the rally, reducing the credibility of the claim denying the connection. On the other hand, the conservative party accused the liberal party of deliberately framing the second wave of infections as the conservatives’ fault. They pointed out the “double standard” of the media and the government blaming only the rally participants when the KCTU held a mass gathering on the same day, and claimed that KCTU members bypassed the tracking orders Gwanghwamun members were subjected to***********. When a patient from the KCTU rally was wrongly represented as a Gwanghwamun participant, conservatives claimed this was a deliberate attempt to further blame the political right while the liberal party claimed it was an honest mistake by a worker************. The KCTU denied these allegations, accusing the conservative party of redirecting blame to save face, and cited the safety measures they took as a valid reason for the supposed discrimination between the two groups. Regardless, after a confirmed infection of a KCTU member and continued criticism of biased treatment, authorities expanded COVID-19 testing to all people who gathered that day*************.

   The highly frustrated public, on the other hand, wanted to punish authority figures that permitted the rallies in the first place. In particular, Judge Park Hyung-soon of the Seoul Administrative Court was heavily criticized for allowing some rallies to occur; a petition demanding the judge’s penalization and dismissal gathered over 300,000 signatures on the Blue House’s petition board. However, the Korean Bar Association defended the judge—the constitutional right for political assembly was a legitimate reason to permit rallies, they said, and expressed concern for Judge Park’s judicial independence being “jeopardized” by the backlash.

   Ultimately, however, all fingers pointed to the Sa rang je il Church. Professor Jung pointed to some uncooperative behavior of the rally members as troubling. “In particular, there’s a problem of interpreting the government’s prevention methods as political and spreading fake news about false diagnoses of uninfected people.” The Sa rang je il members, who took up a significant portion of the rally, are certainly showing signs of this. Not only did many infected parishioners attend, but they also avoided safety measures, drawing significant public condemnation. Chosun Ilbo reported various cases of church members harassing medical workers, refusing treatment, and even escaping hospital care to roam public places. The outrageous attitude of Pastor Jeon also appalled the nation. He didn’t take any accountability for encouraging his congregation to join the rally, and instead called the government’s preventive methods a hoax and demanded an apology from the government. These series of events turned the majority of the public’s back on them, even those with like-minded political goals, and led to the general church community being put in a bad light. The government didn’t issue an apology to Pastor Jeon; instead, on August 18, the city of Seoul sued the church for ₩4.6 billion. According to JoongAng Daily, the amount accounts for fines for providing fake records and breaking the Infectious Disease Prevention Act, as well as damages ranging from costs of operating community treatment centers to the revenue that was lost by public transportation following the stringent distancing measures.

Ramifications on society

   Regardless of who’s to blame, it was undeniable that COVID-19 cases were rising once more. As the virus spread all around the country, the medical community was soon overwhelmed again. “When the increase rate was slow,” Professor Jung explained, “more thorough epidemiological surveillance and prevention was possible. However, as the number of patients increased, the lack of medical personnel and the rapid exhaustion of resources made thorough examination harder. There were even medical centers that simultaneously treated everyone with light symptoms instead of employing the previous one-on-one treatments because of the sheer increase in number,” she added.

   With tracing made difficult and infection rates steadily rising, the South Korean government was quick to reinforce social distancing protocol. The Korea Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (KCDC) implemented enhanced distancing known as “Level 2.5” from August 30 to September 13 in the Seoul Metropolitan area, which entailed take-out rather than in-person food services, online education, and suspension of “high-risk” businesses. Professor Jung pointed out that “Level 2” already indicates a situation where common medical services are overwhelmed by the spread of infections to local communities, and that the daily infection rate was enough for “Level 3” just by the number. “‘Level 3’ is banning all non-essential gatherings and activities and requesting everyone to stay home, the equivalent to the United States’ or Europe’s ‘lockdown’,” she explained. “This was too big of a socioeconomic risk and would change people’s lives too drastically, which is why ‘Level 2.5’ was put in place.”

   Along with stricter social distancing, the government toughened consequences for those who didn’t follow the safety protocols. In response to evasion, false information, and obstruction of preventive measures, the government put out a “zero-tolerance approach” where violators of the Infectious Disease Prevention Act would face criminal charges. For instance, The Hankyoreh reported that seven rally participants from Gwangju were arrested after lying about their participation. However, public condemnation of the rally has further pushed attendees into the shadows, inciting a vicious cat-and-mouse game between authorities and participants.

   In regard to heightened social distancing and the government’s request to refrain from in-person church services, the Christian community, especially the Protestant community, had divided reactions. In a meeting at the Blue House with Christian leaders, Reverend Kim Tae-young, head of The United Christian Churches of Korea, claimed that “religious freedom is not a value that can be exchanged for life,” insisting for in-person services. Others within the community showed differing views; back in March, Kim Kyeong-jin, a senior pastor at So-mang Presbyterian Church claimed in his sermon that insisting on in-person services in current circumstances would violate one of the Ten Commandments: the prohibition of murder. Despite criticism from outside and inside the community, however, many churches maintained in-person services. According to The Hankyoreh, more than half of the surveyed churches in various regions in Korea (except Daegu and Seoul) carried out in-person services after the second wave of infections. Moreover, it was highly likely that many churches had been open since, or even before, the rally. The reluctance to halt in-person gatherings is not surprising. The Korea Times explained that Korean churches have a strong sense of community that is intertwined significantly with the members’ lives beyond religion. Moreover, Protestant churches have a decentralized leadership structure, unlike Catholic churches, and share independence from other institutions and from each other. Not only is there no central entity to represent the denomination’s official stance, but there’s also a lack of inter-church cohesion, leading to confusing and contradictory behavior depending on the church or the pastor. Even within the religious community, people become fragmented as they deal with the social ramifications of the wave of infections.

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   The second outbreak was characterized by the fragmentation of various societal groups—the rally was able to amass a wide range of attendees because of the public’s high frustration and stark division of opinions, and the aftermath of the rally caused even more separation as people disagreed on what’s right and wrong. The second wave of infections, even though it was anticipated, dealt a huge blow to the Koreans’ general health, morale, and trust in each other; even as infection numbers go down, the discord and distrust between authorities, politicians, churches, and citizens created by this event will remain. Efforts to maintain the virus in check will continue and will require more cohesion, for the rally has shown that the virus does not discriminate.

*Edaily

**Yonhap News

***Hankook Ilbo

****JTBC

*****KBS

******Chosun Biz

*******MBC

********Johns Hopkins Coronavirus Resource Center

*********The United Future Party changed their name to People Power Party on Aug. 31.

**********DongA Ilbo

***********MSN

************Chosun Ilbo

*************MBC