TRUMP’S INCOHERENT ramblings on Twitter do not amount to much of a foreign policy worth analyzing. However, his administration’s disjointed collection of foreign policy choices does present an interesting point of comparison. It would be easy to assume that with Trump gone, President Biden could rescue U.S. foreign policy and reinvigorate U.S. leadership in the world. Yet it is not that simple. The new administration has a monumental task in front of them as they seek to repair the damages and confront more fundamental issues.

The scorecard under Trump 

   Trump’s foreign policy of “America First” was characterized by three major tendencies. The first was his disdain for the rules-based liberal international order through which the United States has and continues to project its influence. Trump’s disregard for these institutions limited American flexibility in the exercise of power, pushing the Trump administration to take an even more extremist approach to foreign policy.

   Secondly, Trump dismissed the importance of alliances. He viewed all international relationships as a zero-sum game and believed even his allies to be simple liabilities. His administration attempted to extract money from America’s most essential allies, threatening to withdraw U.S. forces if he didn’t get his way. This outlook is fundamentally flawed; alliances are widely understood as mutually beneficial and cannot be reduced to mere financial transactions[1]. U.S. allies lost confidence in America’s ability to uphold its security commitments and gravitated towards other powers. Moreover, Trump’s disregard for them led to significant instability. This was especially pronounced in East Asia, where South Korean-Japanese relations deteriorated almost beyond repair in 2019. Although a compromise was eventually reached under U.S. pressure, it is hard to imagine any other U.S. president allowing tensions between its two most important Asian allies to escalate to the degree it did at the height of the diplomatic spat involving the General Security of Military Information Agreement.

   Lastly, one of the most pronounced failures was due to his idiosyncratic habits, namely attention-seeking. Most notably, Trump treated the North Korean situation as a temporary political fuel, refusing to invest in foreign policy objectives that would last beyond his administration. The historic moment of Trump’s first meeting with Chairman Kim produced very little, beyond increased media attention. World leaders adapted to this new type of diplomacy by engaging in unabashed flattery, with President Moon publicly massaging Trump’s ego by claiming that he deserved the Nobel Peace Prize. Japan’s former Prime Minister Abe was speculated to have exerted some influence on this volatile leadership by gifting Trump gold-plated golf clubs and frequenting his private golf course. Abe would also make last-minute phone calls to him before important negotiations. Needless to say, much of this theatre often obscured and detracted from important alliance objectives in East Asia.

Fundamental challenges

    Trump is gone, but it will not be clear sailing for the new administration. America faces two major challenges, both of which have been exacerbated by Trump, but whose causes far outdate his presidency. The first is the meteoric rise of China. China’s economy grew from one-tenth of the United States in 2000 to over 70% in 2020[3]. Its military power has grown concomitantly. Conversely, the relative decline of the United States in both power and prestige has accelerated in the past four years.

    The second challenge is domestic. Several terms have been used to describe it: parochialism, populism, tribalism. Whatever the most befitting term, the emergence of radical anti-internationalist and “anti-foreign policy” sentiment in the United States is worrisome. Such sentiment is not limited to one side of the political spectrum. The extreme left and right both decry American commitments around the globe; being the “indispensable stakeholder,” is a burden they think their country should not bear.

   How will Biden react to these challenges? In an article for *Foreign Affairs*, Biden described his foreign policy as “a foreign policy for the middle class,” one that will “[renew] democracy at home” while simultaneously “mobiliz[ing] collective action” and “get[ting] tough with China”. 

   His administration has emphasized the importance of domestic policy in meeting unprecedented foreign policy challenges. Biden knows that if the United States is to successfully balance China in East Asia and restore confidence in America around the globe, he must first heal internal divisions, grow the economy, and regain moral strength back home. For these reasons, Biden has put domestic challenges at the forefront of his foreign policy agenda. Biden has appointed Susan Rice, a foreign policy expert who served in numerous foreign policy-related positions during the Obama administration, as the director of the United States Domestic Policy Council[4]. Her appointment shows that the domestic foreign policy nexus is a very real policy objective that will dominate Biden’s first term. For Biden, combating COVID-19, rolling back Trump’s “draconian” policies on immigration, and healing domestic divisions are the most important goals on his foreign policy agenda that will define his foreign policy legacy[5].

   The major goal of American foreign policy in Asia is expected to remain similar to those before Trump; Biden will continue American efforts to counter China. Unlike Trump, however, he will be less brazen and adopt a wider range of diplomatic tools to achieve this end, such as pushing for human rights, utilizing multilateral institutions, and strengthening alliances. This will lead the United States to be viewed as a more responsible stakeholder.

   In their first phone call, Biden pressed President Xi on the Chinese Communist Party (CCP)’s human rights violations in Hong Kong and the Xinjiang province[6]. Enforcing economic sanctions against China is likely to be portrayed as a moral obligation in the future given the CCP’s disregard for human rights rather than being justified on economic grounds.

   A key strategic node in containing China was the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), which Biden pushed for as vice president. While the unpopularity of the TPP prevents him from immediately rejoining it despite pressure from Japan and other member countries[7], some sort of trade deal to deter Asian nations from gravitating towards China is likely to be forthcoming if domestic resistance can be overcome[8].

   Lastly, Biden has stressed the importance of allies. For Biden, allies are an integral part of the United States’ grand strategy. Without them, the United States is unlikely to retain its strategic advantage against China. Biden will have to rebuild trust between America and its allies, meaning that he will also likely continue some Trump-era policies such as expanding the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue[9].

Caught in the crossfire

   What does this mean for South Korea? There are three major dynamics that will characterize the South Korean-U.S. relationship this decade. The first is that the United States will seek to facilitate a cooperative relationship between its two major allies in East Asia, South Korea, and Japan. As competition between the United States and China becomes more pronounced, Washington will see stability across the Korean Strait as a prerequisite for foreign policy success. The United States is more likely to play a proactive role in mediating disputes between the two countries. Both Seoul and Tokyo will be under more pressure to de-escalate tensions. As a result, cross-strait relations are likely to stabilize.

   The second dynamic concerns North Korea. Biden expressed that he views his predecessor’s diplomatic meetings with Kim as a “vanity project,” and that he would not replicate unless clear end goals are stipulated beforehand[10]. Moreover, the new administration will put more pressure on North Korea regarding its cases of human rights violations and not prematurely lift sanctions, effectively returning to the policy of strategic patience implemented by Obama. This will clash with the Moon administration, which has been less vocal in denouncing North Korea and views diplomatic inroads in relations with North Korea as one of its greatest accomplishments. The Moon administration will have to simultaneously convince Pyongyang of the benefits of interacting with Seoul, rather than Washington, and Washington of the benefits of diplomacy with Pyongyang. The former seems to be a far easier task. Prior to the COVID-19 outbreak, Pyongyang snuffed offers from Seoul, only seeking diplomatic meetings with Washington. This is likely to change as desperation drives Pyongyang to be more willing to work with Seoul.

   Lastly, South Korea will come under increasing pressure from both Washington and Beijing as great power competition reaches its climax. So far, the Moon administration has attempted to hedge the two against one another, underscoring its security ties to the United States and economic ties to China. Although this policy has allowed Seoul to enjoy the benefits of cordial relations with both powers, the policy is unsustainable in the long term. South Korea’s strategically important position in East Asia will leave neither power satisfied with the status quo. It is likely that Seoul will have to “choose a side”. Whether this reckoning will occur in the immediate future or be postponed as a result of the fortuitous emergence of a gifted policymaker in Seoul continuing the balancing act remains to be seen.

[1]Wall Street Journal

[2]Japan Times

[3]IMF

[4]KBS

[5]Foreign Affairs

[6]AP

[7]Japan Times

[8]Foreign affairs

[9]Times of India

[10]DW