WHILE THE West is endeavoring to contain the aftermath of the Taliban’s takeover of Afghanistan, Russia is one of the few countries that has not been critical of the terrorist organization. It is somewhat surprising that most of Russia's official statements have lauded the Taliban’s “valiant efforts” to bring stability to the region, especially when the Soviet-Afghan War (1979-1989) is taken into account. During this decade-long war, Afghan mujahideen fighters, many of whom later became part of the “original Taliban,” and the USSR (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) were adversaries. The USSR was unsuccessful in its goal to establish a communist regime in Afghanistan, with the mujahideen driving them out of the country in the late 1980s. However, the dawning of a new age with the end of the Cold War meant new interests, enemies, and alliances; uneasy cooperation has ensued between the Taliban and Russia, as both sides recognize they have shared interests.

How did the animosity start?

   Like most major conflicts, the trigger for the Soviet-Afghan War was seemingly inconsequential: a domestic coup d'etat in Afghanistan, the Saur Revolution. During the Saur Revolution in 1978, the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA), the communist party, overthrew then-President Khan Daoud Mohammed[1]. As the PDPA lacked popular support, they turned to the USSR for support and began introducing aggressive land reforms, modernization, and suppressed opposition by executing political prisoners. These reforms were not welcomed by the elite class and conservative rural populations and led to the rise of mujahideen fighters, anti-communist rebels from tribal and urban groups. A mere year after the coup, internal chaos spread as the PDPA experienced internal rivalries, and the majority of the country rebelled against the PDPA.

   Domestic and international support for the Soviet-backed regime and the mujahideen fighters played a role in the outcome of the war. Fearing that inter-party conflict would lead Afghanistan to turn to the United States, the USSR invaded in late 1979 to salvage the pro-communist government[2]. The Soviet-backed government still lacked popular support, and military loyalty to the communist cause was nonexistent; Afghan soldiers were ineffective against the mujahideen fighters as most soldiers deserted their government. Along with domestically weak support, the USSR’s international supporters included only Angola, East Germany, Vietnam, and India. In contrast, the mujahideen fighters garnered support from all over the country and the world, including the United States, the United Kingdom, China, Iran, Saudi Arabia, and Pakistan[3]. Specifically, they received immense financial support from the United States, the United Kingdom, China, the Arab states in the Persian Gulf, and Pakistan. Pakistan also provided military training to the mujahideen rebels on top of transporting weaponry across their shared border. Besides material goods, intelligence agencies provided the mujahideen with key information that led to the eventual withdrawal of the Soviet soldiers[4]; the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) worked with Pakistani intelligence services to coordinate and fund military operations meant to frustrate the Soviets.

   As the war went on, the Soviets realized that their initial plan to secure towns and stabilize the Afghan-communist government and withdraw in a year was impossible. For almost a decade, the Soviets faced over 250,000 mujahideen fighters, cold weather, and Afghanistan’s mountainous terrain. When Soviet casualties rose to over 15,000 and around 60,000 wounded, the USSR signed an agreement with the United States, Pakistan, and Afghanistan to withdraw all troops by 1989. Despite their victory, the mujahideen and civilians suffered great losses as well. At least 56,000 mujahideen fighters died, and 17,000 were wounded; experts estimate that one million civilians were killed[5]. In addition to lives lost, Afghanistan’s already poor economy worsened; the decade-long war made Afghanistan one of the most underdeveloped nations in the world, ranking 170 out of 174 in the United Nations Development Programme’s (UNDP) Human Development Index[6].

The enemy of my enemy is my “friend”

   Under new names, the hostility between the Taliban and Russia persisted as both sides blamed the other for human casualties and economic collapse. Many of the mujahideen fighters became founding members of the Taliban; the leader of the mujahideen rebels, Khalis Mohammad Yunus Mohammad, also enjoyed a close relationship with the Taliban’s commanders[7]. The collapse of the USSR in 1991 led to the nation to be renamed the Russian Federation, or more commonly, Russia.

   In 1999, the last year of the Taliban’s rule, the Taliban announced support for guerrilla fighters in Chechnya, a Russian republic. Putin Vladimir became Prime Minister by a landslide in the same year after promising a hardline stance against the Taliban and the rebels in Chechnya[8]. The U.S. invasion of Afghanistan in 2001 allowed Putin to fulfill his campaign promise as the Taliban could no longer afford to support the rebels. Russia willingly helped U.S. forces in Afghanistan and saw the invasion as a chance to improve relations with the West. The Russian government allowed the West to use its airspace and railways to transport troops and permitted them to set up bases in countries bordering Afghanistan. Weakened and ousted from power, the Taliban eventually reached out to Moscow for support against Western forces, but Moscow refused and celebrated Kabul’s collapse in the early 2000s.

   As relations between the United States and Russia soured due to differences in government ideologies and long-term regional interests, Russia established communication with the Taliban in 2007, and hostilities ended between the former enemies. Russia had two main purposes when it reached out to the Taliban for better relations: opposition against the West and elimination of the Islamic State (IS)[9], a terrorist organization. Many IS fighters, mainly active in the Levant[10], fled to various provinces in Afghanistan; these fighters, known as the Khorasan branch of IS, are operational in northern Afghanistan. Russia feared that these terrorists would invade Central Asia and threaten Russian influence. The Russian government believed that the Taliban was more capable of defeating IS than the official Afghan government due to the Russian perception that the Afghan government was merely a puppet government controlled by the United States[11]; in 2018, Russia warned US and North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) troops of unidentified helicopters delivering weapons to IS. Lack of US response, combined with the fact that these helicopters entered Afghanistan in NATO-controlled airspace, led Russia to doubt the United States’ commitment to fight IS[12]. Because of such instances, Russia closed the routes that NATO used to transport troops to Afghanistan and began sharing intelligence on the IS’s movements with the Taliban. Russian intelligence announced that with the Taliban’s help they were able to stop a potential IS terrorist attack in Moscow, Astrakhan, and Kabardino-Balkar in July of 2021[13]. Kabulov Zamir, a Russian envoy to Afghanistan, spoke highly of the Taliban’s assistance, saying they “will restrain the growth of threats from [IS]” in the north.

   In addition to the alliance against the IS, from 2017 to present-day, Russian officials have been holding official meetings with the Taliban that exclude the official Afghan government, defying Western interests[14]. In an interview with The Yonsei Annals, Dr. Olga Krasnyak (Prof., Dept. of International Relations, National Research University Higher School of Economics) said that she “believes in diplomacy,” and that “the meetings are Russia’s rational and diplomatic response to the Taliban threat because military interference is not the answer. Russia thinks that an Afghan government should include the Taliban, other ethnic groups, and so on.” Dr. Krasnyak also gave another reason for Russia’s cooperation with the Taliban. “The members of the Taliban are ethnic Pashtuns, and a majority of the people in Afghanistan are Pashtuns as well,” she explained. “We cannot ignore the fact that ethic loyalty plays a key role in domestic politics. Despite the atrocities that the Taliban has committed, Russia has no choice but to negotiate with them.”

The Russian reaction

   Russia has shown a “calm and pragmatic” response to the Taliban’s takeover of Afghanistan in August of 2021. Dr. Krasnyak said that “one of the reasons for Russia’s calmness was that it recognized that the Taliban’s eventual victory was inevitable. During the Soviet-Afghan War, Russia learned its lesson and expected America to fail.” President Putin has acknowledged that the Taliban has successfully regained control of Afghanistan and argues that all countries should act based on this reality[15]. He also dismissed concerns about the lack of democracy in the Taliban-led Afghanistan; he said that Western countries’ attempts “to preserve their [Western] influence [in Afghanistan] [was] disguised as efforts to promote democratic principles.” Furthermore, President Putin said that "if a nation needs democracy, it will end up establishing it so there is no need to do that by force,” disagreeing with continued foreign interference in Afghanistan[16]. Other Russian officials have also expressed similar views. For example, Kabulov said that Akhundzada Hibatullah, the current Supreme Commander of the Taliban, is more capable than the “puppet government” and is more open to negotiations[17]. Even Russian state media has softened its rhetoric against the Taliban, referring to them as “radical” instead of “terrorist[18].”

   In response, the Taliban has signaled its willingness to engage with Russia as equal partners. Unlike other foreign embassies in Afghanistan, the Russian embassy is not in a state of emergency and has no plans to evacuate[19]. Within 48 hours, Ambassador Zhirnov Dmitry was personally reassured that the embassy and its personnel would not be harmed by Taliban representatives. According to the Russian government, Russian citizens in Afghanistan have also not been evacuated, which is a stark contrast to most other countries. Dr. Krasnyak said that she sees “the lack of evacuations and the day-to-day continued operations of the Russian embassy as a success of Russian diplomacy.”

Russia’s next steps with the Taliban

   The Taliban and Russia have not been hostile towards each other as they both want to protect their national and economic interests in the region. Moscow wants to protect its influence and military bases in Central Asia[20]. It wants to engage with the Taliban on its own terms to avoid the internal instability in Afghanistan from spilling over into Central Asia and Russia. For example, Russia fears that the Taliban’s victory in Afghanistan might inspire the separatists in Chechnya to renew their efforts for independence from Russian rule. The Chechen people are a Muslim minority, living predominantly in Russia’s North Caucasus region[21]. After Soviet soldiers withdrew from Afghanistan in 1989 and the USSR’s subsequent collapse, the Chechen started a separatist movement, the Chechen All-National Congress. This movement led to two wars against Russia; the First Chechen War ended in a ceasefire in 1996 because Russia failed to control the mountainous terrain in Chechnya. Three years later, the Second Chechen War broke out with Russia emerging as the victor in 2009. However, instability in Chechnya still poses a threat because Chechen fighters have known military and financial ties to al-Qaeda, a long-term ally of the Taliban. These ties with al-Qaeda, combined with the Taliban’s support for Chechen rebels in the late 1990s, threaten stability in Russia’s periphery. The Taliban’s current stance on Chechnya is unknown; a revival of the independence movement in Chechnya will also lead to instability in neighboring Central Asian countries and undermine Russia’s leadership in the region.

   In addition to religion, Dr. Krasnyak also said that “ethnicity is also a concern for Russia in Central Asia as well.” Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan, both with Muslim-majority populations, have held their own talks with Taliban officials and have signaled that they will recognize the Taliban-led government. Russia fears that the common religion shared between them and the Taliban will weaken its influence and strengthen the Taliban’s influence in Central Asia instead. As for ethnicity, Dr. Krasnyak continued, “As many people in Central Asian countries and Afghanistan are part of the same ethnic group, Russia worries that some people in Central Asia may feel a sense of camaraderie with the Taliban, which will weaken Russian dominion in the region.”

   The Taliban seeks to establish economic ties with Russia. The Taliban controls $3 trillion worth of natural resources including fossil fuels, iron, copper, lithium, cobalt, and other rare-earth minerals[22]. Many of these resources could not be used because the country was embroiled in internal conflict. The Taliban’s unchallenged rise to power means that internal conflict is minimal, so these resources can now be utilized to grow Afghanistan’s economy. However, Russian interest in a Taliban-led Afghan economy depends on whether the Taliban will act as a responsible stakeholder. Given Afghanistan’s long history of economic collapse and lack of practical economic reforms, Russia’s potential investments are conditional on the Taliban’s promise to stabilize Afghanistan. If the Taliban-led Afghanistan does turn out to be an economically stable nation, Russia hopes that by engaging with the Taliban-led government’s mineral and fossil fuel industries, the Taliban will cease its opium and heroin trade, which destabilizes the borders of Central Asian countries and Russia[23]. Greater economic ties could lead to more cordial relations. By maintaining friendly relations with a responsible Taliban, Russian officials want to preemptively contain all potential Taliban-related issues by engaging with them on Russian terms[24].

*                 *                 *

   In conclusion, Russia has shown a pragmatic and diplomatic approach to the Taliban’s takeover in Afghanistan. While, historically, the two have been enemies, it is in Russia’s interest to establish normal relations. Now, the Taliban hopes that Russia will officially recognize its government as legitimate, so that it can gain a permanent voice in the international order. So far, Russia has been reluctant to take such a step; however, President Putin recently stated that the sooner Taliban joins the international community of civilized countries, the sooner diplomatic channels will be established. When asked directly if Russia would recognize the Taliban officially, Putin said that there would be “no political force to talk to directly if Afghanistan breaks up as a country,” signally that Russia is open to such a move in the near future[25]. Regardless of official recognition, the world is watching to see how Russia’s carefully planned partnership with the Taliban will pan out.
 

[1] Britannica

[2] The Atlantic

[3] The Conversation

[4] National Security Archive

[5] National Public Radio

[6] Human Development Reports

[7] Slate

[8] CEPA

[9] Islamic State: A terrorist organization, known commonly as IS, ISIS, or ISIL

[10] Levant: The Eastern Mediterranean region of Western Asia, including Lebanon, Syria, Iraq, Palestine, and Jordan

[11] Reuters

[12] TASS

[13] Voice of Russia

[14] Slate

[15] ABC News

[16] TASS

[17] BBC News

[18] BBC News

[19] NPR

[20] News18

[21] Council on Foreign Relations

[22] DW News

[23] Reuters

[24] MEI

[25] CGTN